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LABOR LAW AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS* and JAMES GILMER BOWMAN, JR.**
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
The decisions of Tennessee appellate courts during the survey period
have dealt extensively with the major area of controversy in current
labor relations law-federal pre-emption.' The number of Tennessee
decisions handed down which relate to injunctions restraining directly
or indirectly the activities of labor organizations exceeds that in any
recent comparable period. Clarification of the law applicable in the
courts of the state to such activities, however, has not been achieved
through these decisions. Two were reversed subsequently without
opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States, 2 and these two
reversals, in turn, present serious questions as to the ultimate effect
of the holdings in three additional Tennessee cases of the survey pe-
riod.3 The problem is further complicated when consideration is given
to the United States Supreme Court's affirmance 4 of a Wisconsin
injunction three weeks after the reversal of the Tennessee decisions.
One of the Tennessee decisions involved picketing to achieve a purpose
deemed contrary to the state's "right-to-work" statute, as did the Wis-
consin case.
Even before the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act 5 certain types of state regulation of labor relations were
considered to be forbidden because incompatible with federal law.6
In 1947 detailed regulation of certain activities of labor organization
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
** Attorney, Office of Solicitor, United States Department of Labor; member,
Tennessee Bar.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
those of the United States Department of Labor or any other Federal agency.
1. See, generally, Marmet, Federal Preemption, Free Speech and Right to
Work Statutes, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1957).
2. Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957) (per
curiam); Local 429, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL v.
Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957) (per curiam).
3. Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 298 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn,
App. M.S. 1956); Covington Truck Co. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL, 298 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956); National Carloading Corp.
v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1957).
4. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284
(1957).
5. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952). The official name of this
legislation is Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. It has five subchapters,
the second of which consists of an amendment of the National Labor Relations
Act. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) was approved on
July 5, 1935. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
6. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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were incorporated in the National Labor Relations Act as union "unfair
labor practices" subject to the remedies provided in the statute when
a labor dispute would affect interstate commerce.7 In the same statute,
provision was made for cession of jurisdiction by the National Labor
Relations Board to a state under certain conditions and limitations. 8
The area of exclusive federal regulation of the subject matter cov-
ered by the statute (that is, federal preemption or occupation of the
field) 9 was forcibly presented in Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL,
in 1953.10 This case held that Pennsylvania courts had no jurisdiction
to enjoin peaceful labor union activity which, because of its purpose,
was forbidden as an unfair labor practice under NLRA. Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.," in 1955 made clear that the federal preemption
in the labor field included preventive relief against conduct protected
by NLRA as well as that forbidden by it. In General Drivers Union,
AFL v. American Tobacco Co.' 2 the United States Supreme Court in-
dicated that, even though the refusal of carrier employees to cross
their own picket line resulted in the carrier's failing to provide the
service it was obliged to render under state law, exclusive jurisdiction
was in the NLRB (so that a state court could not issue an injunction).
Intermixed with these and other federal preemption cases have been
decisions upholding the continued jurisdiction of the state courts to
protect persons and property against violence and to accord damages
for unlawful conduct in the area of traditional "police power," even
though such conduct is also regulated by federal law.
13
In Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v. Cook Truck Lines, Inc.14 the Court
of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section, held (in an opinion by Judge
Felts) that a shipper was entitled to an injunction requiring truck
7. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
8. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952). No such cession has ever
been reported.
9. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REVISED AND AN-
NOTATED 246-52 (Corwin ed. 1952).
10. 346 U.S. 485 (1953). There had been other cases between 1947 and
1953 holding state action in the labor relations field to be unauthorized. See,
e.g., International Union of United Automobile Workers, CIO v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454 (1950).
11. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
12. 348 U.S. 978 (1955) (per curiam); cf. Local 25, Teamsters Union, AFL v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
A federal court will not entertain a suit to enjoin an employer from pur-
suing a state court remedy in this preemption area, Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955), except upon the application
of the NLRB when the same matter is pending before that agency, Capital
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). On the removal of state court
proceedings to Federal court, see Gilbert, Removal and Remand Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 7 Lab. L.J. 745 (1956).
13. International Union, United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Anderson, 351
U.S. 959 (1956) (per curiam); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical
Workers, CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
14. 296 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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lines to continue to render their customary service and restraining a
labor union, its officers and agents from interfering with the carriers
and their employees in rendering such service. The refusal of trucking
company employees to cross a picket line (established in this instance
by another union in a strike against the shipper) was permitted by
contract between the trucking company and the union representing its
employees. The opinion declares that such a refusal is not "concerted
activity" protected under section 715 of the NLRA. Since it was also
not an unfair labor practice forbidden by section 8 (b)16 of NLRA it
was found subject to state law which required service by the carrier
and its employees. Apparently the General Drivers case was deemed
inapplicable because the carrier employees in that case had refused
to cross their own picket lines instead of the lawful picket line of
another union. The United States Supreme Court's reversal of this
Tennessee Court of Appeals decision reads: 17
Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee is reversed. Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468; General Drivers Union v. American Tobacco Co.,
348 U.S. 978.
The opinion of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section,
written by Judge Felts, in Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Associated
Transp., Inc.,18 involved a contempt proceeding for the violation of an
injunction comparable in many aspects to that in the Kerrigan case.
The reasoning of the court's opinion was substantially the same. It
was declared that there is no federal preemption because the refusal
of trucking employees to cross the picket line of another union to
render customary service to a shipper and receiver is neither protected
nor prohibited by the NLRA. The chancellor's decree finding that
certain of the trucking company employees, their union and its officers
were guilty of contempt for failing to obey the injunction was affirmed
by the court of appeals. The court observed that, even if the injunction
was irregular or erroneous, it was bound to be obeyed while it re-
mained in force. In light of the Supreme Court's reversal in the
Kerrigan case this point becomes of major importance in considering
the continued significance of the decision.' 9
Two additional cases involve less directly the obligations of a car-
rier, its employees and the union representing its employees in cross-
ing picket lines. In Covington Truck Co. v. International Brotherhood
15. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
16. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
17. Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957).
18. 298 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
19. The court cites Nashville Corp. v. United Steelworkers, CIO, 187 Tenn.
444, 450, 215 S.W.2d 818, 821 (1948). See also United States v. United Mine-
workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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of Teamsters, AFL,20 a trucking company which was being picketed
by a union representing the employees of other truck lines sought a
mandatory injunction against the other truck lines, union officials and
the union to compel the interlining of freight. The chancellor dismissed
the bill as to the union and the named union members and officers but
ordered the carriers (and their employees) to interline freight with
the plaintiff company without regard to any "hot cargo" or other
contractual limitations. The defendant motor carriers did not appeal;
nor did any of their employees. The union had contracts with these
carriers permitting employees to refuse to handle "hot cargo" or cross
picket lines.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, in an opinion by
Judge Carney, dismissed the appeal of the union and union officers.
The court reasoned that these parties had challenged the jurisdiction
of the state court below on the theory of federal preemption, and had
requested dismissal and that the chancellor had granted the request as
to them, without assignment of error being made. Hence, the court
found that a final and binding ruling on the court's lack of jurisdiction
over the union had been made. The court's second ground for dismiss-
ing was that the union's interest as bargaining agent for employees of
the truck lines ordered to interline freight is not sufficient to entitle
it to appeal from the order.
In National Carloading Corp. v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,
21
an injunction was sought against certain motor truck carriers of freight
to compel them to receive freight tendered them for transportation
by the plaintiff. A labor union petitioned for leave to become a party
defendant, it being alleged that the union represented employees of
some of the defendant carriers and that the relief sought by the com-
plainant would compel a violation of bargaining agreements with the
union as to the privileges of such employees. The chancellor denied
the petition of the union to intervene and the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee affirmed with an opinion by Chief Justice Neil. It is noted
from a stipulation that the union desired to challenge the jurisdiction
of the court, and the opinion declares that intervention for such a
purpose will not be allowed.
The Covington Truck and the National Carloading cases illustrate
possibilities of complexity in the concept of federal preemption that
have not yet received adequate attention either from the Supreme
Court of the United States or in decisions such as these. Insofar as
preventive relief is to be afforded against labor organization pressures
related to the duties of employees of motor carriers, it seems that the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board has been
20. 298 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
21. 298 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1957).
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clearly established in the General Drivers and Kerrigan cases. This
is based on the idea of primary and exclusive jurisdiction over a block
of subject matter to the extent indicated in the congressional regulation
of labor relations affecting interstate commerce. This area of exclusive
jurisdiction presumably will not be affected by state court determina-
tions whether they deal directly or obliquely with the prevention of
certain types of activity by labor organizations and their members.
In the Tennessee cases just discussed the merits of the central problem
would be presented, presumably, if contempt proceedings for viola-
tion of court order should be instituted against trucking company em-
ployees who claimed the privilege under union contract not to handle
"hot cargo" or who refused to cross a picket line. However, even here
the question of preemption might be avoided if it is held that the
court order must be obeyed until properly set aside on appeal and
that it cannot be collaterally attacked.22
In Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Local 429, International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, AFL,23 the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
in an opinion by Justice Prewitt, upheld an injunction, secured by a
company whose business affected interstate commerce, against a union
that engaged in "stranger picketing" found to be in violation of the
state's "right-to-work" law.2 4 The court rejected the contention that
the NLRB had jurisdiction over the subject matter to the exclusion of
state courts. On May 27, 1957, this decision was reversed per curiam
by the Supreme Court of the United States.26 The reversing memoran-
dum decision merely cited the Garner and Anheuser-Busch cases.
On June 17, 1957, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v.
Vogt, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a Wiscon-
sin injunction against peaceful picketing deemed to be for the purpose
of coercing an employer to put pressure on employees to join a labor
organization-thus violating a state statute. The issue of federal pre-
emption is not discussed in the case (there is no reference to any effect
on interstate commerce) but attention is given to the problem of free
speech limitations on state regulation of peaceful picketing-particu-
larly the "stranger picketing" situation. The opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter is of major importance in demonstrating that virtually
no substance remains in the free-speech doctrine (apart from blanket
prohibitions against picketing) as a restraint on injunctions if the
picketing involves pressures designed to achieve an object forbidden
by the law of the state (and, it might be added, in an area where state
22. See note 19 supra.
23. 299 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1957).
24. TENN. CODE A-N. § 50-208 to -213 (1956).
25. Local 429, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL v.
Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957) (per curiam).
26. 354 U.S. 284, (1957).
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policies are free to operate). The importance of the Farnsworth deci-
sion in this connection is, apparently, to demonstrate that federal pre-
emption can defeat the state injunction, although "free speech" does
not, if the situation is within the general coverage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, even though the picketing is aimed at conduct forbidden by the
state "right-to-work" law. Taft-Hartley allows such state laws to
operate and presumably be effective within their terms.2 7 But preven-
tive relief which becomes concerned with the purposes of labor organi-
zation activities where interstate commerce is affected apparently
must be secured from the NLRB if it is to be available from any source.
In Pruitt v. Lambert28 the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld an
injunction against "stranger picketing" deemed coercive against
rights under the "right-to-work" statute. The union denied the co-
ercion, stating that it had never insisted on discharge of any employee
or upon any employee's joining the union. The opinion of Justice
Swepston found violation of the spirit if not the letter of the "right-to-
work" statute in the contract proposed by the union, the refusal of
which led to union picketing with signs that referred (truthfully) to
work under non-union conditions at the location. The opinion declared
that the picketing was not merely for the purpose of advertising but
was coercive with illegal objectives. No federal preemption issue was
involved under the facts as stated in this case; nor in a contempt pro-
ceeding for violation of an injunction against mass-picketing which was
decided during the survey period.29
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Not only the appellate courts of Tennessee but also the legislature
considered the workmen's compensation statute during the survey
year. The legislature increased the maximum benefits under the
statute to $11,000 and the maximum weekly benefits to $32.30 These
had been $10,000 and $30, respectively. Also, nursing services ordered
by the attending physician were added to the medical benefits due an
employee from the employer,31 and, perhaps most important to the
profession itself, the fees of attorneys were regulated. The employer
or his insurance carrier is to pay a court-approved fee on that part of
the recovery for the benefit of the employer or carrier in a third
party action, and the fee for any excess is to be paid in accordance with
the employee's contract with his attorney.
32
27. 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952). See Mamet, supra note 1.
28. 298 S.W.2d 795 (Tenn. 1957).
29. Gunn v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 296 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. 1956).
30. Tenn. Pub. Laws 1957, c. 270, § 1-3 amending TENN. CODE ANN. §§
50-1007, 50-1008, 50-1010, 50-1011, and 50-1013 (1956).
31. Tenn. Pub. Laws 1957, c. 234, § 1 amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1004
(1956).




Two cases reported during the survey year involved suits grounded
on an employer's negligence in connection with an employee's injury.
The first, Thurmer v. Southern Ry.,33 was an employee's suit under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act,34 which provides for a negligence
action for the work-connected injuries of certain railroad employees.
The employer cannot defend the suit on the basis of assumption of
risk or the fellow servant rule, and a concept of comparative negligence
is substituted for the defense of contributory negligence.
In the Thurmer case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals for the Eastern
Section reversed a directed verdict for the railroad. The employee
had been opening a valve when the plug blew out and the escaping
steam injured him. The court of appeals held that the jury should
have been allowed to determine whether the employer was negligent
by failing to discover the defect in the valve, by permitting excessive
steam pressure to build up in the pipes while the valve was being
opened or by allowing the steam pressure to be on while the employee's
duties required him to be near the valve, since there was evidence in
the record on which such negligence could reasonably have been found.
Lenoir Car Works v. Littleton35 was an employee's common law
action for damages for the employer's negligence in not protecting
him against contracting silicosis while working in the employer's
establishment. The jury returned a general verdict for $25,000 for the
employee, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals for the Eastern Section
affirmed. The employee alleged that his silicosis was diagnosable prior
to March 12, 1947. Otherwise, he would have been limited to an action
for workmen's compensation. 36 Though the jury answered a special
interrogatory by finding that the disease could have been diagnosed
as silicosis in 1948, this was set aside on the ground that it was not
responsive and did not preclude a finding that the disease was diag-
nosable as silicosis prior to March 12, 1947. The employee based one
count of his action on the statutory provision prohibiting an employer
from using any material or process in such a way as to create a condi-
tion injurious to the health of employees,3 7 but the court found it
unnecessary to determine whether an action could be founded on this
provision of the Code since the count in negligence was sufficient to
sustain a judgment for the employee.
The Employment Relationship: In two decisions reported during the
survey year, Tennessee's highest court dealt with questions concerning
the employment relationship under the workmen's compensation
statute.
33. 293 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
34. 35 STAT. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1954).
35. 293 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1102 (1956).
37. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-403 (1956).
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Kamarad v. Parkes38 was defended on the ground that the employee
seeking compensation was an independent contractor rather than an
employee within the meaning of the statute. The defendant was a
lumber company which was constructing a house for the person who
apparently engaged the plaintiff, a carpenter, to assist in the construc-
tion. The company was found to be engaged in the activity of con-
structing houses and was furnishing the plans, material, and labor
for the one in question. The trial court also found that the company had
relied upon the laborer's, furnisher's, and materialmen's lien statute
for security and indicated, in waiving the lien, that it was the furnisher
of the labor for building the house. The testimony of the company's
officials also was to the effect that there was no difference in the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the other workmen. The trial court
further found that the defendant company had exercised control over
the construction work and had the right to do so. The Supreme Court
affirmed on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding of the existence of the employer-employee relationship.39
Apparently the court was willing to imply the employment relation-
ship, necessarily based on a contract of employment, because the de-
fendant accepted the plaintiff's services up to the time of his injury
and was accepting them at that time.
Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Lett" provided the court an opportunity
to reiterate its now-familiar rule that in determining whether a worker
is a casual employee, and hence not covered by the statute, "it is the
regularity of the employer's exercise of a given employment that is
important .... 41 A casual employee is defined in the statute as "one
who is not employed in the usual course of trade, business, profession,
or occupation of the employer." 42 The employer in the instant case
was engaged in the business of operating a commercial truck line.
Also, the company operated a pleasure resort where several employees
were regularly retained to maintain it. The deceased employee, whose
widow brought this suit for survivors' benefits, had worked at the
resort when he was not engaged in his own agricultural activities
and was working there when he was killed by a stroke of lightning.
The fact that other employees were regularly engaged in the main-
tenance of the resort was prima facie evidence that its operation was
in the employer's regular course of business. As the court said, "If
the employer 'regularly' employs employees in a given class of work,
this may be evidence that such work is in the usual course of such
38. 300 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1957).
39. Citing D. M. Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 206 S.W.2d 897 (1947).
40. 297 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. 1956).
41. Dancy v. Abraham Bros. Packing Co., 171 Tenn. 311, 102 S.W.2d 526, 531
(1937).
42. TENN. CODE AN. § 50-906(b) (1956).
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an employer's trade, business, or occupation. ' 43 Thus, the irregularity
of the deceased employee's employment was unimportant.
The case appears to be in line with prior decisions of the court.4
Injury by Accident Arising Out of Employment: For workmen's
compensation to be awarded, it must be shown, among other things,
that an employee suffered an injury by accident "arising out of" the
employment. To arise out of the employment, the injury must be
causally connected with the employment by more than mere coin-
cidence.
Mason-Dixon Lines v. Lett, also involved a determination of the
causal connection between the employment and the injury. The
deceased employee had been watering the resort's lawn by means of
aluminum pipes through which water was pumped. During a thunder
storm he went outside to turn off the pump. While touching it, he was
killed by a lightning stroke conducted through it to his body. The trial
court awarded compensation, and the Supreme Court held there was
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the employment
of the deceased involved a special risk of being struck by lightning.
The court stated, apparently on the basis of judicial notice, that the
pump was made of iron or steel. It said that in Jackson v. Clark & Fay,
Inc.,45 ... this Court noted that acts of God are compensable under
the statute when the employee, by reason of his duties, is exposed to
a peculiar danger from such act; that is, one greater than persons
generally in the community. The rule seems to be general, and is
well established. The difficulty is in determining when it is appli-
cable."
46
In the Jackson case, an employee was killed by a tornado while
driving a truck, and the court reversed a compensation award. The
decision in the instant case seems consistent with what the court
appears to regard as the rationale of the Jackson case and with the
usual rule in cases in which an employee's injury or death results from
a stroke of lightning.47 It should be noticed that the court took judicial
notice of the fact that the pump was made of iron or steel. Whether
the finding that the pump with the aluminum pipes attached would
be unusually likely to attract lightning was based on judicial notice
43. Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Lett, 297 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1956), quoting
from Dancy v. Abraham Bros. Packing Co., 171 Tenn. 311, 102 S.W.2d 526, 531
(1937).
44. Rhyne v. Lunsford, 195 Tenn. 664, 263 S.W.2d 511 (1953); United States
Rubber Products v. Cannon, 172 Tenn. 665, 113 S.W.2d 1184 (1938). For dis-
cussions of tests in other states to determine whether employment is casual,
see 1 LARSON, WORxMNx'S COlvmENSATION LAW § 51 (1952) and RIESENFELD
AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIL LEGISLATION 192-193 (1950).
45. 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d 389 (1954). For a discussion of the case. see
Sanders and Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1956 Ten-
nessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1037, 1044-47 (1955).
46. 297 S.W.2d at 95.
47. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 44, §§ 8.11-.12.
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or testimony was not indicated. It would not be unusual to take
notice of such a fact, but how far the court might go in noticing the
attraction of lightning in other circumstances remains to be seen.
48
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a com-
pensation award under the Tennessee statute in Eureka Cas. Co. v.
Phillips.49 A coal miner was found dead where he had been working
in a mine. On the day of his death, he had mined eighteen tons of coal,
an extraordinary amount according to the court, in a shaft forty-five
inches high, which necessitated his shovelling while on his knees. He
was lying on his back with his hands crossed over his chest and his
shovel under some coal. This indicated to the court that he was about
to lift the load of coal when he was stricken. The court said that he
was stricken either with a brain hemorrhage or heart failure, or by
overexertion which aggravated a pre-existing condition so as to cause
his death. Relying on Tennessee precedent,50 the court said that when
an employee is found at his post of labor without direct evidence as to
the manner of his death, an inference may arise of an accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment. This makes a prima facie
case of compensation liability, and since the employer did not have
an autopsy to determine the cause of death, as he was entitled to do,
and introduced no evidence to rebut the inference of a work-connected
death, a compensation award was proper under the circumstances.
The Tennessee Supreme Court would not necessarily have reached
a different result had it been confronted with the facts in the case,5 1
and the result seems to be in accord with the general rule.52 However,
in Tennessee the mere fact that an employee is found dead at his post
of duty in a mine seems not to be sufficient to make a prima facie
case of a work-connected injury by accident,53 but the circumstances
in the instant case seem sufficient to raise an inference of a connection
between the work and the death.
54
A deceased employee's mother sought survivors' benefits in Volz v.
Southerland.55 Although the court said the dependency of the mother
was one of the two questions involved in the case, it held that the evi-
dence supported the finding that she was a compensable, partial de-
pendent but neglected to mention what the evidence was. The other
48. On the subject of judicial notice in lightning cases, see 1 LARSON, op. cit.
supra note 44, § 8.11.
49. 233 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1956).
50. Cunningham v. Hernbree, 195 Tenn. 107, 257 S.W.2d 12 (1953). The
court said Wilson v. St. Louis Terminal Distributing Co., 198 Tenn. 171, 278
S.W.2d 681 (1955), was distinguishable on its facts.
51. See, e.g., Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402 (1955); 1Mii-
stead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610 (1948).
52. 1 LARSON, OP. cit. supra note 44, § 10.32.
53. Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402 (1955); Lay v. Blue
Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953).
54. See Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610 (1948).
55. 292 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1956).
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question was whether the employee's death arose out of and in the
course of his employment.
The deceased was a construction worker engaged in levelling the
bottom of a ditch when he was severely burned while using the handle
of his shovel to move a bucket with fire in it. He had kindled the fire
in the bucket and carried it into the ditch for warmth. He placed it
too close to some of the construction material in the trench and was
fatally burned in attempting to move it. The employer contended
that the injury did not arise out of the employment because "his act
was wholly unauthorized and not foreseeable and was for his own
private purpose .... -56 But the court disagreed. It found that the evi-
dence was conflicting as to the employee's permission to have this fire
in the trench but tended to show that the employer knew or should
have known of this practice and had not forbidden it. It also said
that it was common knowledge .that construction workers kept fires
about in cold weather. Thus, such action was not unexpected and
indeed might be said to aid the employees in proceeding with the
work of the employer. The court indicated that the test is that the
accident "need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event
it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the em-
ployment and have flowed from that source as a rational conse-
quence."
5 7
In Sandlin v. Gentry,58 the court affirmed the dismissal of a widow's
suit. Her husband, an employee, had rebuked a fellow employee and
later called him a vile name and struck him. The assaulted employee
shot and killed his assailant. The court held that though the altercation
occurred on the employer's premises during working hours the en-
counter was personal between the parties and deceased was the aggres-
sor and guilty of wilful misconduct because the attack was without
any excuse. Thus, the death did not arise out of and in the course of
employment. As one authority has said, "The great majority of juris-
dictions which have considered the question of aggression apart from
express statutory defenses have held that the aggressor in an admit-
tedly work-connected fight cannot recover compensation."59 But in the
instant case the court failed to find any connection between the work
and the assault and resulting homicide.
Injury by Accident in the Course of Employment: It has been said
of the "course of employment" aspect of the work-connection test in
compensation cases that: 
60
56. 292 S.W.2d at 387.
57. 292 S.W.2d at 388, relying on Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S.W.2d 977
(1951); Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87 (1947);
Whaler v. Patent Button Co.. 184 Tenn. 700, 202 S.W.2d 649 (1947).
58. 300 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1957).
59. 1 ,ARSON. op. cit. supra note 44, § 11.15(a).
60. 1 id. § 14.00.
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An injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes
place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee
reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.
The same writer adds: 61
Under the modem trend of decisions, even if the activity cannot be said
in any sense to advance the employer's interests, it may still be in the
course of employment if, in view of the nature of the employment environ-
ment, the characteristics of human nature, and the customs or prac-
tices of the particular employment, the activity is in fact an inherent
part of the conditions of that employment.
McAdams v. Canale62 was a case of first impression, and the facts
were undisputed. The employer was a sole proprietor who had em-
ployed the injured employee to perform a variety of functions. She was
employed to purchase phonograph records for use in the business and
do the bookkeeping, banking, and typing and secretarial work. She was
also to obtain a notary commission so as to be in a position to execute
contracts used in the business, and to drive her employer in his car on
business missions. Further, it was understood that she would be ex-
pected to do personal shopping for her employer and drive him and
members of his family on personal trips, which she had done.
63
The employer had directed her to drive him to an out of town foot-
ball game, and she was injured in an automobile accident while doing
so. Because the trip was not related to the employer's business, the
trial court dismissed her compensation action on the ground that the
injury did not arise out of her employment. The Tennessee Supreme
Court reversed. It said:
64
Where, as here, the employee is doing what he or she is directed to do
by the employer (in this instance the sole employer) it seems reasonable
that an injury which arose during the course of this employment that the
employee was directed to do should be compensable.
Although the court seemed to regard the case as involving the
"arising out of" factor, the question would properly seem to be
whether the injury was incurred "in the course of" the employment,
particularly in view of the above-quoted explanation of the phrase.
Statue of Limitations and Notice of Injury: The Tennessee Supreme
61. 1 id. § 20.00.
62. 294 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 1956).
63. That travel on the highway can, under some circumstances, be in the
course of employment even though there is a regular place of work elsewhere
is well-recognized. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut'l Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
64. 294 S.W.2d at 699. °The court relied on a Mississippi case, National
Surety Coro. v. Kemp, 217 Miss. 537, 64 So. 2d 723 (1953), reaffd, 217 Miss 560,
65 So. 2d 840 (1953).
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Court affirmed an award of compensation for an occupational disease
in Underwood v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.65 The employee had
first contracted the disease in 1951 and had suffered from it off and on
until he became disabled in 1954 when he was found to have suffered
a new attack of the disease. The court held that the statute of limita-
tions barred recovery for the injury in 1951 but not for the new attack
in 1954 since it began to run from the time the employee became in-
capacitated for work.
The holding in Lampley v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.66 was
that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding
of a reasonable excuse for failure to give the required notice of injury
within thirty days after "the first distinct manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease." 67 An employee died five days after he ceased work
due, according to the doctor's diagnosis at the time, to pneumonia or
heart disease. X-rays, examined after the death, showed he had
silicosis. This was not discovered by his dependent, uneducated, eighty-
year-old father, until approximately five months after the employee's
death. The court held that under the circumstances, the father had
acted with the prudence of one of his education and age and that
there was a reasonable excuse for not giving the required notice within
the thirty-day period. The court added that the employer did not
appear to have been prejudiced by not receiving timely notice of
the injury.
Finality of Awards: An employee was injured and was paid com-
pensation. Then he sued for additional compensation, but his suit was
dismissed on the ground that he had received the compensation to
which he was entitled. When he later sued again for additional
compensation, the court held, in American Snuff Co. v. Helms,68 that
the judgment in the prior action was final and barred this second
suit even though the full extent of the injury was not discovered until
just before this suit was instituted. The workmen's compensation
statute would permit the opening of an award within six months after
its date69 but not later. If the award in the prior suit had provided
for reopening in the event of a change of condition, the employee
could have maintained this suit.70
Dependency and Survivors' Benefits: An employee was killed and
survivors' benefits awarded his daughter and her minor, illegitimate
son as dependents. Subsequently the mother and father of the illegiti-
65. 300 S.W.2d 901 (Tenn. 1957).
66. 300 S.W.2d 876 (Tenn. 1957).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1107 (1956).
68. 301 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1957).
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1025 (1956).
70. Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 168 Tenn. 481, 79 S.W.2d 576
(1935).
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mate child married and thereby legitimated him. In Royal Indemnity
Co. v. Jackson,71 the insurer sued to be relieved from paying compen-
sation to the child since, under the statute,7 2 he had come to be con-
clusively presumed to be dependent on his father. The court, relying
on prior authority,7 3 held that subsequent events would not be consid-
ered to affect the rights of dependents if they were dependents within
the meaning of the statute at the time of the employee's injury or
death, which is the point in time at which dependency is determined.
Though under the statute a child under sixteen-years of age is con-
clusively presumed to be dependent on the father, dependency in fact
on another person may be shown.74
The case appears to be in accord with the general approach to the
problem and seems sound from a practical standpoint. 5 As one author-
ity has said, "While this may produce occasional results inconsistent
with the spirit and purpose of compensation protection, the adminis-
trative convenience of crystallizing of rights as of some definite date
once and for all probably counterbalances the objection."
76
Employer's Duty to Furnish Medical Treatment: In Atlas Powder Co.
v. Grimes,77 an employee with a work-connected injury was treated
by a doctor supplied by the employer but had not fully recovered
when the treatment ceased. Without notice to the employer, he selected
a doctor of his own choice and underwent an operation. The doctor
which the company supplied did not feel qualified to perform the
necessary operation or one of the ugual diagnostic tests for an injury
such as the employee had sustained. The court affirmed a compensa-
tion award which included recovery of the medical expenses incurred
by the employee for the treatment of his injury. It said that the
employer had not complied with the statute by designating three or
more doctors for the selection of the employee 8 and that the doctor
supplied did not do what was necessary for the employee's injury. In
such circumstances, the employee was free to choose his own doctor
and hold the employer accountable for the resulting expenses within
the statutory limit of $1,500.
79
71. 300 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. 1957).
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1013 (1956).
73. Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald, 143 Tenn. 505, 226 S.W. 215 (1920).
74. Ibid.
75. 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 44, § 64.40.
76. Ibid.
77. 292 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. 1956).
78. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1004 (1956).
79. The court distinguished the earlier case of Irwin v. Fulton Sylphon Co.,
179 Tenn. 346, 166 S.W.2d 610 (1942), on the ground that the applicable
statutory provision had been amended so as to make the rule in that case
inapplicable. At the time the Irwin case was decided, the statute required the
employer to furnish medical care and the court had held that the employer
was entitled to select a physician to treat an employee. If the employee refused
the proferred treatment, the employer was not liable for the cost of treatment
procured by the employee. The court also held the last paragraph of TENN.
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Atlas Powder Co. v. Grant8° was the second case during the survey
year involving an employee dissatisfied with the medical treatment
provided by his employer. The employee had been treated by "about"
three of the employer's doctors and did not feel that he had recovered
when told that he needed no further treatment. Without notice to
the employer, he selected a doctor and underwent an operation which
apparently was not entirely successful. The court permitted recovery
of the medical expenses incurred by the employee by saying, inter
alia, that the employee "... cooperated with the company and its physi-
cians, and that when he found out that he was not cured it was then
only he sought out the services of an independent physician." 81
The chief justice, with whom Justice Tomlinson concurred, dissented
saying, inter alia, "It is my view that the real object of the Workmen's
Compensation Law in requiring the employer to furnish medical aid
and the employee to accept it was that there should be a consultation
between them in order to fix liability where the employee elects to
insist upon the services of a doctor of his own selection."82 The em-
ployer had a right to select three or more doctors from which the
employee might choose and should have been given that opportunity
before the employee could select a doctor independently and hold
the employer liable for the resulting expense.
However, it should be noted, though the court did not stress it,
that in both the Grimes and Grant cases the doctors furnished by the
employer had indicated that no further treatment was necessary. At
that point the employees obtained medical treatment on their own.
Thus, it seems that the court is adopting the view that the employer,
through his doctors or otherwise, discontinues at his own risk furnish-
ing the medical aid required by the statute.
Extent of Injury: In Whitaker v. Morton Frozen Foods, Inc.,83 the
employee was awarded compensation for fifty per cent permanent
partial disability of one of his arms, and the court affirmed. The third
finger of the hand had been severed and the fourth finger almost sev-
ered. As the result of an operation, the "cupping" of the palm of the
hand and wrist was limited and the employee was unable to pick up
anything heavy or make a fist with the hand. The court said that
though the medical evidence was contradictory, there was substantial
evidence to support the award. The injury might have been limited
CODE ANx. § 50-1004 (1956) inapplicable. That paragraph limits the employer's
liability for medical expenses to $100 if in an emergency or on account of the
employer's failure or refusal to provide the required medical services or care
they are provided by the employee or his dependents. The court stated that
the legislature must have felt that the provision had another meaning, but
no hint was given as to that other meaning.
80. 293 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. 1956).
81. 293 S.W.2d at 182.
82. Id. at 184.
83. 300 S.W.2d 610 (Tenn. 1957).
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to the fingers or hand but for the operation, but "it is settled law in
this State that an employee may recover workmen's compensation for
a new injury, or aggravation of his injury resulting from medical or
surgical treatment."' '
Proof of Disability: One doctor in Morrison v. Jamees testified that
an employee was suffering from a work-connected injury and another
indicated that his disability could have resulted either from a work-
connected injury or a cause having no connection with his employment.
The court held that in such circumstances, the finding of the trial
court will not be upset on review since the trial court could reasonably
have drawn either of two inferences from the evidence.8
In Hamlin & Allman Iron Works v. Jones,8 7 the employee testified in
detail about his physical condition and then gave his conclusion as to
the extent of his disability. This was corroborated by his wife, but two
physicians testified they could find nothing wrong with him. A com-
pensation award was affirmed by the court, which said, "It has long
been the rule in this State that a lay witness may testify to his own
physical condition or that of another person provided that the witness
first states the detailed facts and then gives his opinion or conclusion."
'
Computation of Awards: The court held in Willoughby v. Warstler
& Egly Bakery, Inc.,8 9 a case of first impression, that in computing the
compensation due an employee for a permanent partial injury under
the schedule, it was proper to deduct from the award the amount paid
the employee for temporary partial disability. While the amount paid
for temporary total disability may not be credited against the compen-
sation provided in the schedule because of a specific statutory pro-
vision,90 there is no statutory prohibition against deducting temporary
partial disability payments from the amount provided for permanent
partial disability.
Oden v. Foster & Creighton Co.91 involved an employee who suffered
temporary total disability for nine days from the date of the injury.
Under the statute, he could not receive compensation for the first
seven days of disability, and the eighth and ninth days were Saturday
and Sunday. The workweek began on Monday and ended on Friday.
The court held the employee was nonetheless entitled to two days of
compensation for the temporary total disability by virtue of the
84. 300 S.W.2d at 613, citing Revell v. McCaughan, 162 Tenn. 532, 39 S.W.2d
269 (1931).
85. 298 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1957).
86. Citing Lynch v. La Rue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85 (1955); R. W.
Hartwell Motor Co. v. Hickerson, 160 Tenn. 513, 26 S.W.2d 153 (1930).
87. 292 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1956).
88. 292 S.W.2d at 29, citing Norton v. Moore, 40 Tenn. 480 (1859); Stephens
v. Clayton, 22 Tenn. App. 449, 124 S.W.2d 33 (M.S. 1938).
89. 298 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1957).
90. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 50-1007(c) (1956).
91. 298 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. 1957).
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statute.
92
The court held in Kamarad v. Parkes,93 discussed above, that com-
pensation may be awarded in a lump sum only with the consent of
the parties.9 4 Thus, the trial court erred in commuting a compensation
award, other than for medical benefits, to a lump sum over the em-
ployer's objections.
Procedure: In Adams v. Patterson,95 the court held that since an
appeal from a lower court's judgment or decree in a workmen's com-
pensation case is in the nature of a writ of error,9 6 a motion for a new
trial must be made and overruled in the lower court before an appeal
can be taken.
92. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1007 (a) (1956).
93. 300 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1957).
94. Citing as controlling, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1023 (1956); Knoxville
Knitting Mills Co. v. Galyon, 148 Tenn. 228, 255 S.W. 41 (1923); American
Zinc Co. v. Lusk, 148 Tenn. 220, 255 S.W. 39 (1923).
95. 301 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. 1957).
96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1018 (1956).
